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Rental of Principal 
Residence Pending 
Sale
Has Bolaris Set a New Precedent?
By Paula B. Thomas and Zoel W. Daughtrey
A decision rendered by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Bola­
ris case1 may set a new precedent 
for taxpayers who rent their former 
principal residence pending its sale. 
The court held that the taxpayers 
were entitled to both the exclusion 
of gain on the sale of their residence 
afforded under Internal Revenue 
Code Section 1034 and the deduc­
tion of rental expenses covered 
under Sections 167 and 212. Essen­
tially, Section 1034 allows taxpayers 
in most situations to defer the gain 
on the sale of their principal resi­
dence. Section 212 allows a deduc­
tion for expenses incurred in the 
production of income, and Section 
167 allows a deduction for deprecia­
tion of property held for the produc­
tion of income. This article will high­
light the significant facts of the 
Bolaris case, examine the points 
that apparently influenced the court’s 
decision, and discuss planning op­
portunities and potential pitfalls for 
taxpayers in similar situations.
Overview of the Bolaris Case
Significant Facts. Stephen and 
Valerie H. Bolaris purchased a home 
in 1975 for $44,000; this home was 
their principal residence until Octo­
ber 1977, when they moved into a 
more expensive new home they had 
constructed. The Bolarises had con­
tinually attempted to sell the first 
home from July 1977, until it was 
ultimately sold in August 1978 for 
$70,000.
After trying unsuccessfully for 
ninety days to sell their home, the 
Solarises rented it on a monthly 
basis to “lessen the burden of carry­
ing the property.”2 Eight months 
passed with no offers to purchase 
the house, and the couple decided 
that the property might be more 
saleable without the tenants. Six 
weeks after asking the tenants to 
leave, the Solarises received and 
accepted the first offer to buy their 
former residence. Due to the buyers’ 
difficulty in immediately obtaining 
financing, the Solarises temporarily 
rented the home to the buyers; sub­
sequently, financing was obtained, 
and the sale was consummated one 
month later.
The Bolarises excluded the gain 
on the sale of their old home and 
also deducted rental expenses and 
depreciation that exceeded their ren­
tal income, thus resulting in a tax 
loss from their rental activities.
Position Taken by the IRS. The 
IRS disallowed the rental expenses 
and depreciation, and on the day of 
the trial in Tax Court, filed an 
amended answer to also challenge 
the deferral of gain. Primarily, the 
IRS contended that the depreciation 
and rental expenses were not de­
ductible under Sections 167 and 
212. The IRS did not seriously ques­
tion the Bolarises’ right to defer gain 
from the sale of their former princi­
pal residence because the IRS con­
tended that the house was never 
converted from personal use.
The IRS’s theory was that deferral 
of gain (Section 1034) and deprecia­
tion and rental expenses (Sections 
212 and 167) were mutually exclu­
sive. They contended that property 
could not simultaneously be a prin­
cipal residence and property held 
for the production of income. The 
IRS further claimed that permitting 
both rental expenses and nonrecog­
nition of gain would provide an im­
proper “windfall” to taxpayers.
The Tax Court, in a split decision, 
agreed with the IRS that a residence 
that qualifies for nonrecognition of 
gain under Section 1034 cannot, as 
a matter of law, also be held for the 
production of income under Sec­
tions 212 and 167.
Criteria Used by the Ninth Circuit 
Court. In the appeal filed in the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, three 
questions were posed for the court 
to address. First, did the sale of the 
Bolarises’ principal residence qual­
ify for nonrecognition of gain under 
Section 1034? If so, could the prop­
erty simultaneously qualify for de­
duction of rental expenses under 
Sections 167 and 212; i.e., are Sec­
tions 167/212 and 1034 mutually 
exclusive? If the sections are not 
mutually exclusive, had the Sola­
rises successfully converted their 
property to income-producing prop­
erty to allow deduction of these rent­
al expenses?
Deferral of Gain. Despite the lack 
of a serious challenge by the IRS to 
the Solarises’ right to defer recogni­
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tion of gain under Section 1034, this 
was the first issue addressed by the 
Ninth Circuit Court. In supporting 
the taxpayer’s right to exclude gain, 
the court relied on the legislative 
history of Section 1034:
The term "residence” is used on 
contra-distinction to property used 
in trade or business and property 
held for the production of income. 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that 
the taxpayer temporarily rents out 
either the old or the new residence 
may not, in the light of all the facts 
and circumstances in the case, 
prevent the gain from being not 
recognized. For example, if the 
taxpayer purchases his new resi­
dence before he sells his old resi­
dence, the fact that he rents out 
the new residence during the period 
before he vacates the old residence 
will not prevent the application of 
this subsection.1 23
1. the length of time the house 
was occupied by the individual 
as his residence before placing 
it on the market for sale;
2. whether the individual prema­
nently [sic] abandoned all fur­
ther personal use of the house;
3. the character of the property 
(recreational or otherwise);
4. offers to rent;
5. offers to sell.
The court pointed out several fac­
It would appear that the court 
could have also used the “actual 
occupancy” rule4 to allow the tax­
payers to avoid recognition of the 
gain under Code Section 1034. Since 
the taxpayers had occupied the res­
idence during the statutory period 
required by Section 1034, the non­
recognition could also have been 
allowed on that basis.
Sections 167/212 and 1034 — 
Mutually Exclusive? The Circuit 
Court secondly addressed the issue 
of whether property that qualifies 
for exclusion of gain under Section 
1034 can, as a matter of law, also be 
property held for the production of 
income under Sections 167 and 212. 
Again, the legislative history of Sec­
tion 1034 was examined. The statu­
tory predecessors to Sections 167 
and 212 were enacted in 1942; Sec­
tion 1034 was enacted in 1951. In 
1943, the Tax Court held in Robin­
son5 * that an abandoned residence 
that has been diligently listed for 
sale or rent does qualify as property 
held for the production of income. 
The fact that the property in Robin­
son was never actually rented was 
not deemed a determining factor. In 
the Solaris case, the Circuit Court 
noted that presumably Congress was 
aware of Robinson at the time of 
enactment of Section 1034. Accord­
ingly, if Congress had intended the 
Sections to be mutually exclusive, a 
provision to that effect could have 
been included in Section 1034. The 
court also stated that the interpreta­
tion of the legislative history to mean 
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that a former residence could qual­
ify for nonrecognition of gain de­
spite its temporary rental, and also 
qualify as property held for the pro­
duction of income, had never been 
questioned until Solaris.
Deductibility of Rental Expenses. 
After determining that the property 
could simultaneously qualify as a 
principal residence and property 
held for the production of income, 
the court next addressed the Sola­
rises’ right to deduct rental expenses.
The Court held that 
the taxpayers were 
entitled to both the 
exclusion of gain on 




Section 1034 and the 
deduction of rental 
expenses covered 
under Sections 167 
and 212.
Code Sections 167 and 212 entitle 
taxpayers to a deduction for these 
expenses if "the individual [is en­
gaged] in the activity with the pre­
dominant purpose and intention of 
making a profit.”6
The Circuit Court adopted a non- 
exhaustive list of five factors set 
forth by the Tax Court in Grant7 to be 
considered in the determination of 
whether or not a residence has been 
converted to property held for the 
production of income: 
tors that supported the existence of 
the Bolarises’ profit motive during 
the rental period, regardless of the 
fact that the ultimate objective was 
to sell the property. First, and most 
significantly, the taxpayer actually 
rented the former residence at fair 
market value. Secondly, the Sola­
rises permanently abandoned their 
old home when they moved to their 
new residence. Thirdly, the former 
residence offered the taxpayers no 
elements of personal recreation. The 
court found that the only benefit of 
the old residence was to generate 
income (which, in this case, could 
be used to minimize the negative 
cash flow of mortgage payments 
prior to the sale).
The IRS pointed out that the nega­
tive cash flow, even with fair market 
rental, was evidence of the lack of a 
profit motive. The Ninth Circuit Court 
countered this by quoting the major­
ity opinion of the Tax Court: "renting 
the residence at its fair market value 
would normally suggest that the tax­
payer had the requisite profit objec­
tive.” The court concluded that sus­
tained, unexplained losses are in­
dicative of a lack of a profit motive, 
but they are only one factor to con­
sider. In the opinion of the court, the 
other factors presented above out­
weighed the existence of the short­
term losses incurred.
Divided Court Decision. The Ninth 
Circuit Court’s decision to reverse 
the Tax Court’s disallowance of rent­
al expenses was not a unanimous 
one. In a dissenting opinion, Judge 
Reinhardt stated that he felt that 
Sections 167/212 and 1034 are mu­
tually exclusive; he based his feeling 
upon the same legislative history of 
Section 1034 used in the majority 
opinion. This disagreement is likely 
to arise in other circuits as well, per­
haps to the extent that Solaris may 
not be followed.
A significant question arises in the 
interpretation of a key portion of 
House Report No. 586 (82d Con­
gress): “Nevertheless, the mere fact 
that the taxpayer temporarily rents 
out either the old or the new resi­
dence may not, in light of all the 
factsand circumstances in the case, 
prevent the gain from being not 
recognized.”8
The majority opinion of the Ninth 
Circuit Court appears to interpret 
this statement as a strong argument 
for allowing the rental as a "for 
profit” activity, whereas the dissent­
ing opinion appears to interpret this 
statement as primarily meaning that 
temporary rental does not “taint” the 
gain so as to disqualify the rented 
home as a principal residence. Other 
circuits will have to decide which 
line of reasoning is more nearly that 
originally intended by Congress.
New Opportunities for 
Taxpayers
If the other circuits do follow the 
precedent set by the Ninth Circuit 
Court, the Solaris case is certainly a 
victory for taxpayers. However, tax­
payers who find themselves in sim­
ilar situations should be aware of 
criteria set forth by the court in its 
decision. In response to the IRS’s 
contention that allowing nonrecog­
nition of gain and deduction of rent­
al expenses provides an improper 
windfall, the court made three signif­
icant points:
1. Not all rental expenses result­
ing from rentals of former resi­
dences will qualify as deduc­
tions from income-producing 
property. Specifically, rentals 
below fair market value will 
probably not qualify as prop­
erty held for the production of 
income.9
2. Even if such a windfall does 
exist, it is limited to the statu­
tory time designated by Sec­
tion 1034, currently two years.
3. If Congress had intended to 
prevent this “windfall,” a provi­
sion could have been included 
in Section 1034 that the appli­
cation of that Section precluded 
rental expense deductions 
under Sections 167 and 212. 
The court significantly noted 
that since Congress had drafted 
no such provision, they refused 
to imply one. However, if the 
court has misinterpreted con­
gressional intent, Section 1034 
could be amended to include 
such a provision.
Even if the taxpayer is deemed 
under the particular facts and cir­
cumstances not to be holding the 
property for the production of in­
come, he is still entitled to deduc­
tions for some expenses under Sec­
tion 183. This Section allows all de­
ductions that are not predicated on 
the existence of a profit motive 
(e.g., interest and taxes). It further 
allows other deductions that are de­
pendent upon the existence of a 
profit motive, but only to the extent 
that total deductions under this Sec­
tion do not exceed income from the 
activity.10
More Questions Raised
MaDan. It is too soon to ascer­
tain whether other circuits will fol­
low the position of the Ninth Circuit. 
Although the facts and circumstan­
ces are not directly comparable, a 
decision rendered by the Tax Court 
earlier this year in MaDan v. Com­
missioner" (appealable to the Fourth 
Circuit) indicates current disagree­
ment regarding this issue. MaDan 
moved out of his principal residence 
shortly after building it and subse­
quently allowed an employee, who 
was negotiating to purchase both 
the house and MaDan’s business, to 
live in the residence. The employee 
paid utilities and maintenancecosts, 
but no actual rent.
Because the house was listed for 
sale or rent with a broker only after 
the proposed sale to the employee 
had fallen through and the employee 
had vacated the property, the court 
held that it had not been converted 
from a residence to rental property. 
The court stated that the property 
was held primarily for sale rather 
than for the production of income 
through rents, implying that this 
automatically disqualifies the prop­
erty from being income-producing 
property. This line of reasoning con­
tradicts the Ninth Circuit Court’s 
position in Solaris, where the court, 
citing Sherlock12 as support, viewed 
the taxpayers’ desire to sell the home 
as an “insignificant factor in deter­
mining their profit motive.”
A significant factual difference 
between Solaris and MaDan is that 
MaDan did not rent the property for 
its fair market value. The question 
remains unanswered as to whether 
the court’s opinion would have been 
different if the taxpayers had re­
ceived fair market value rental.
Fair Market Value Rental — A Pre­
requisite? Although the court cited 
the five factors noted in the Grant 
case to determine whether or not a 
residence has been converted to 
property held for the production of 
income, a strong point in the Sola­
rises’ favor appears to be their rental 
of the property at its fair market 
value. It is interesting to note that
The IRS’s theory was 
that deferral of gain 
(Section 1034) and 
depreciation and 
rental expenses 
(Sections 212 and 
167) were mutually 
exclusive.
despite the rental affair market value, 
the deductions for rental expenses 
and depreciation generated a net 
rental loss. The Solarises’ mortgage 
payments alone exceeded the rental 
income, thus there was an absence 
of even the opportunity to make a 
short-term profit. Nonetheless, the 
court did not perceive this to be a 
determining factor in their decision; 
they felt that the other factors out­
weighed these short-term losses.
How long can such losses con­
tinue without invalidating the trans­
action as one entered into for profit? 
Or is the length of time not as impor-
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tant as receiving fair market value 
rental? In Jasionowski13, the Tax 
Court determined that the taxpayers 
were not renting their property with 
the requisite profit motive and, ac­
cordingly, were not allowed to de­
duct expenses in excess of their rent­
al income. Jasionowski appears to 
have committed two errors: (1) rent­
al of property below its fair market 
value, and (2) receiving for seven 
years rent income that only covered 
insurance and taxes; he was bound 
to incur a loss. The Tax Court noted 
that although the fact that petition­
ers “incurred losses instead of prof­
its in connection with leasing the 
house . . . does not, in itself, negate 
the presence of a profit motive . . . 
the voluntary acceptance of rent at 
an amount substantially below fair 
market value is a clear indication’’ 
that the taxpayers lacked the requi­
site profit motive. Thus, the court’s 
implication is that losses do not 
negate the existence of a profit 
motive, as long as the property is 
rented at fair market value. One is 
again left to surmise whether the 
court’s decision would have been 
different if the property had been 
rented at fair market value, even 
though the taxpayer might still have 
consistently incurred losses.
that the property was not held for 
the production of income within the 
meaning of Sections 167 and 212.
The court, elaborating in Sher­
lock, stated that “While, under New­
combe, a bona fide offer to rent is no 
longer considered the ‘focal point,’ 
we still consider it of substantial 
importance so long as ‘the adverse 
state of the market for rental prop­
erty’ does not rob such an offer of its 
significance.”
Thus, actual rental of the property 
at its fair market value is a decidedly 
strong point in the taxpayer’s favor; 
nevertheless, its absence will not 
automatically negate the claim that 
the property is held for the produc­
tion of income. As Sherlock and 
MaDan indicate, the mere offering 
of property for rent has met with 
mixed reactions from the courts.
In their determination of whether 
or not the residence qualifies as 
income-producing property, the 
courts do not ignore the potential 
for capital appreciation. In New­
combe, the court noted that:
The placing of the property on the 
market for immediate sale, at or 
shortly after the time of its aban­
donment as a residence, will ordi­
narily be strong evidence that a 
taxpayer is not holding the property 
for postconversion appreciation in 
value. Under such circumstances, 
only a most exceptional situation 
will permit a finding that the statu­
tory requirement has been satis­
fied. On the other hand, if a tax­
payer believes that the value of the 
property may appreciate and de­
cides to hold it for some period in 
order to realize upon such antici­
pated appreciation, as well as an 
excess over his investment, it can
The courts have previously 
reached decisions where the lack of 
actual rental of the property at its 
fair market value did not preclude 
deduction of expenses under Sec­
tions 167 and 212. In Sherlock14, the 
taxpayers offered their house for 
sale or rent, and even though they 
never received offers to rent, they 
were “amenable to any reasonable 
offers.” In a memorandum decision, 
the Tax Court held that the house 
was held by the taxpayers for the 
production of income, despite the 
fact that the house was never rented, 
and thus no income was received. 
The court noted that “the primary 
factor in petitioner’s favor is the 
presence of an offer to rent.” The 
decisions in Sherlock and MaDan 
appear to be at odds; the Tax Court 
noted in MaDan that “listings . . . 
exclusively for rent would not be 
sufficient to establish a profit mo­
tive.”
The line of reasoning in Sherlock 
is consistent with the decision 
reached by the Tax Court in New­
combe15, where the petitioners were 
denied deductions for expenses (in­
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eluding depreciation) on property 
that had formerly been their princi­
pal residence. Continuous efforts 
were made by Newcombe to sell, but 
at no time was the property held for 
rent. Accordingly, the court decided
The court concluded 
that sustained, 
unexplained losses 
are indicative of a 
lack of a profit motive, 
but they are only one 
factor to consider.
be said that the property is being 
'held for the production of income.' 
And this would be true regardless 
of whether his expectation of gain 
was reasonable.
It appears that even though a former 
residence may not qualify as income­
producing property based on a fair 
market rental, it may nonetheless 
qualify if circumstances indicate that 
it is being held for postconversion 
appreciation in the market value.
Limit of the “Windfall” Period? 
The consideration of the rental losses 
incurred by Bolaris poses another 
interesting question. The Ninth Cir­
cuit Court noted that even if the 
IRS’s claim that allowing both non­
recognition of gain and deduction of 
rental expenses provides a “wind­
fall” to taxpayers is valid, such bene­
fits would be short-lived. This wind­
fall would be limited to the statutory 
period dictated in Section 1034, 
which is currently two years.16
However, in several cases the 
courts have allowed exceptions to 
the statutory time requirements set 
forth in Section 1034 when the facts 
and circumstances have so sug­
gested. For example, the Tax Court 
noted in Clapham17 that “each case 
arising under Section 1034 must be 
decided on the facts and circum­
stances presented.” Clapham had 
tried to sell his principal residence 
for almost three years before he 
received his first offer. Financial cir­
cumstances dictated sporadic rent­
al of the property during the interim 
period. In concluding that Clapham 
was entitled to Section 1034 nonre­
cognition, the Tax Court noted that 
Congress clearly intended that a 
taxpayer could lease either his old 
or new residence for a “temporary” 
period, but the difficult issue is arriv­
ing at a definition of "temporary.”
If this same reasoning can be ap­
plied to the Bolaris decision, it ap­
pears that in appropriate “facts and 
circumstances,” the door may be 
open for longer periods of rental 
than dictated by the statutory re­
quirements of Section 1034. This 
would suggest that taxpayers who 
otherwise meet the requirements of 
Bolaris, but who, for reasons beyond 
their control, are unable to sell their 
residence during the statutory period 
set forth in Section 1034, may none­
theless be able to claim the benefits 
of Bolaris under the criteria noted in 
Clapham.
Even if the taxpayer is 
deemed under the 
particular facts and 
circumstances not to 
be holding the 
property for the 
production of income, 
he is still entitled to 
deductions for some 
expenses under 
Section 183.
It should be pointed out that the 
question of the deductibility of rental 
expenses was not raised in Clapham. 
The only issue was whether the sale 
qualified for nonrecognition of gain 
under Section 1034. In holding for 
the taxpayer, the Tax Court noted 
that his “dominant motive was to sell 
the property at the earliest possible 
date rather than to hold the property 
for the realization of income.” This 
comment runs counter to the spirit 
of Bolaris, where the court noted 
that “the Solarises’ ancillary desire 
to sell the old home [was] an insig­
nificant factor in determining their 
profit motive."18
Conclusion
Several tax planning considera­
tions can be derived from the Bolaris 
case.
1. The former residence should 
be offered for rent only at a fair 
market value and not at a bar­
gain price.
2. A negative cash flow is not 
necessarily determinative of the 
absence of a profit motive.
3. If the former residence is leased, 
the lease term should not be so 
long as to interfere with an 
opportunity for an actual sale 
within a reasonable time frame.
4. There should clearly be a per­
manent abandonment of the 
old house. Temporary use may 
taint the transaction, especially 
if the opportunity for recrea­
tional use exists.
5. The purchase of the new resi­
dence and the sale of the old 
residence should occur within 
the two-year time frame required 
by Section 1034, even if the rent­
al of the old residence continues 
for an extended period.
Although Bolaris is undeniably a 
victory for taxpayers, the full impact 
of its ramifications remains unset­
tled. The opinions of the courts are 
not consistent despite the similarity 
of facts and circumstances. Even if 
other circuits do follow the prece­
dent set by Bolaris, taxpayers must 
be alert for the pitfalls the court 
noted in its opinion, particularly the 
requirement that the property be 
rented at its fair market value. Tax­
payers and tax advisors should care­
fully weigh potential risks and re­
wards before relying on the Ninth 
Circuit decision in Bolaris.
Even though Bolaris has given the 
taxpayer the potentiality of being 
able to both exclude gain and deduct 
rental expenses in excess of rental 
income, the Ninth Circuit Court’s 
decision may have only started the 
controversy. Bolaris probably will 
not be the last case before the issue 
is settled. Ω
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